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ABSTRACT
Significant policy effort is devoted to stimulate the development, adoption and diffusion of environ-
mentally-friendly technology. Sceptics worry about the effects of regulation-induced environmen-
tal technology on firms’ competitiveness. Since innovation is a crucial productivity driver, a poten-
tial crowding out of inventive efforts could increase the cost of mitigating environmental damage.
Using matching techniques, we study the short-term effects of regulation-induced environmental
technology on non-green innovative activities for a sample of firms in Germany. We find indeed
some evidence for a crowding out of the firms’ in-house R&D. The estimated treatment effect is
larger for firms that are likely to face financing constraints. However, we do not find negative
effects on the number of ongoing R&D projects, investments in innovation-related fixed assets or
on the outcome of innovation projects. Likewise, for firms with subsidy-backed environmental in-
novations no crowding out is found.
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1 Introduction
Rising environmental concerns, in particular on climate change, have triggered
numerous policy initiatives aimed at limiting further damage. To achieve this
objective the invention and implementation of cleaner production technologies is
vital (Goulder and Schneider 1999, Goulder and Mathai 2000, Gerlagh 2008). En-
vironmental innovation, however, creates externalities that may require policy ac-
tion to provide sufficient incentives for research and development (R&D) directed
at exploring new technologies as well as for the adoption of greener production
methods.
Although environmental policies may be crucial to avoid the socio-economic
cost of environmental disasters, economic policy is also concerned not to threaten
competitiveness of the business sector. Innovation has long been understood to be
an essential driver of such competitiveness (Solow 1957, Griliches 1979, Griliches
and Mairesse 1984). Thus, in principle any environmental policy should be de-
signed such that it avoids a crowding out of other inventive efforts in the affected
firms. In other words, the role of opportunity cost of environmental regulation
ought to be taken into account as "[...] any new environmental R&D that comes
at the expense of other R&D investment will dampen the cost-savings potential of
induced technological change" (Popp and Newell 2012, p. 980).
Environmental regulation, especially command-and-control regulation, has been
particularly suspect to being a source of crowding out effects. Regulated firms
are often obliged to devote substantial financial and human resources to fulfilling
the given requirements. The resources allocated to compliance efforts may then
simply lack for other innovation projects and firms may be forced to scale down
their innovative activities at least in the short-term. The review of the existing
literature shows that only little empirical work has tried to assess the existence
or even the magnitude of a potential crowding out of policy-induced technologi-
cal change. With few exceptions such as Roediger-Schluga (2003) and Popp and
Newell (2012), firm-level analyzes on this issue are basically non-existent.
This study therefore aims to contribute to the understanding of potential side-
effects of environmental regulation at the firm-level. In particular, we study the ef-
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fects of regulation-induced environmental technology adoption on the firms’ other
innovative activities. A crowding out is thus understood as a displacement of
productive inventive efforts by regulation-induced spending for pollution control
technology, regardless whether this is due to own (environmental) R&D or the ac-
quisition of abatement technology. We employ econometric treatment effects mod-
els as well as instrumental variable regressions for estimating the treatment effect
on the treated. A treatment in our case means that regulation had induced these
firms to develop, adopt or implement environmental-friendly technologies. Firm-
level survey data covering the period 2006 to 2008 allows us to assess whether
environmental policy has been effective for the individual firm.
What is more, environmental policy programs often include public R&D sup-
port, for instance, via direct subsidies (Newell 2007, de Coninck, Fischer, Newell
and Ueno 2008). In the following study, we therefore consider subsidies that trig-
gered environmental technology implementation as an (additional) treatment. In
the context of this paper, inducing increased efforts on environmental R&D via
subsidies may come at the cost of other innovative efforts if public as well as pri-
vate R&D funding is diverted away from other areas. On the other hand, it can be
argued that subsidies may be needed to prevent a potential crowding out, espe-
cially in firms with constrained access to financial resources.
This study further adds to previous research as we draw from representative
data covering small and medium-sized firms as well as large firms in Germany
active in a broad range of industries. Germany provides an ideal testing ground for
our analysis as it has been rather active in implementing environmental regulation
and subsidy schemes to stimulate environmental technology.
The article proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of
related literature and German laws and regulations relevant for our study. Section
3 sets out our empirical strategy. Section 4 describes the data from the German
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) used for the empirical analysis. Results will
be presented in section 5 before section 7 concludes.
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2 Previous Research and Contribution
Given the market failures associated with environmental innovations1, many gov-
ernments in industrialized economies attempt to correct them by using policy
instruments. Besides empirical evidence for price-induced environmental inno-
vation2, the efficacy of policy for inducing green technological change has been
stressed: "In general, policy, rather than prices, appears to be the main driver of
innovation in these technologies" (Johnstone, Hašcˇicˇ and Popp 2010, p.146).
A detailed overview of the existing policy tools and their potential effects on
firm-level activities is beyond the scope of this article3 as our focus is on whether
policy-induced environmental technology invention and adoption come at the cost
of other inventive efforts.
A crowding out may question the premise of cost-free controls and may lead
to competitiveness losses at the firm, industry and national level. Despite the pol-
icy relevance of these considerations, only very limited empirical evidence exists,
especially at the firm-level. Although, for instance, Lanjouw and Mody (1996)
who study patent applications find that environmental regulation stimulates re-
lated innovations, they cannot rule out that there had been a crowding out, i.e.
that regulated firms had been even more innovative in the absence of regulation.
As one of the first empirical contributions, Gray and Shadbegian (1998) study
directly a crowding out effect of pollution control spending on conventional (i.e.
other) investments in the pulp and paper sector. They find that a Dollar spent
for abatement investments reduces any other productive investment spending by
1.88 Dollars. Roediger-Schluga (2003) uses firm-level survey data to descriptively
study how Austrian Volatile Organic Compound (VOC) emission standards affect
competitiveness in a small sample of selected Austrian manufacturers and whether
compliance-stimulated innovation crowded out other, more productive R&D. He
1"Pollution creates a negative externality, and so the invisible hand allows too much of it.
Technology creates positive externalities, and so the invisible hand produces too little of it" (Popp,
Newell and Jaffe 2009, p.3).
2For instance Newell, Jaffe and Stavins (1999) find that increasing energy prices are asso-
ciated with new energy-saving technology for air conditioners and Popp (2002) observes patent
applications for energy-saving technologies to respond to increasing energy prices.
3See Jaffe, Newell and Stavins (2002) for a review of the literature. Rennings and Rexhäuser
(2011) provide an overview of policies in place in Germany since the 1960s.
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finds neither unequivocally negative nor positive effects on competitiveness of
manufacturers of regulated products. He concludes that some "firms devoted al-
most their entire R&D budget to developing compliant products" which suggests
that - at least to some extent - compliance efforts may have displaced or postponed
other R&D projects.
Popp and Newell (2012) is another notable exception studying whether new
energy R&D crowds out other types of R&D spending. First, they study the effect
of economy-wide increases in energy R&D on total R&D spending at the industry
level and find little evidence of a crowding out across sectors. Secondly, at the
firm level, they use patent data to examine changes in the research portfolios of
companies engaged in alternative energy R&D and find that green patenting does
crowd out other types of patenting. Yet, their results also suggest a high social
value of the former as alternative energy patents are cited more frequently. Since
the sample of firms in Popp and Newell (2012) consists of large, publicly traded
and patent-active firms, no conclusions can be drawn for small and medium-sized
firms, which are more likely to be affected by financing constraints for R&D4.
Especially in financially constrained firms the amount of resources allocated to
environmental technology reduces those resources available for other innovation
projects. If firms additionally have to re-allocate financial resources to compliance
efforts due to regulations and standards, research budgets, especially of long-term
research projects in non-environmental-related areas, may be scaled-down. Thus,
although environmental technologies are socially very valuable, a crowding out of
other fundamental R&D may dampen the social benefits to environmental regula-
tion. When implementing environmental regulation that aims at stimulating envi-
ronmental technology at the firm-level, it seems crucial to think about sources of
funding for such activities, for instance, via subsidy schemes. Fischer and Newell
(2004) compare R&D subsidies and other policies aimed at reducing carbon emis-
sions in the U.S. electricity sector. They conclude, however, that R&D subsidies are
the least effective policy tool for reducing emissions. Yet, they do not consider so-
cial returns from knowledge spillovers that justify R&D subsidies and do not take
4See for instance Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011) for recent empirical evidence for Germany.
They show that financial constraints for R&D decrease monotonically with firm size, while this is
not the case for investments in physical assets for which financial constraints are less binding.
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into account the use of a policy mix in which subsidies are only part of the policy
spectrum.
Few other studies focus on the industry or national level. Jaffe and Palmer
(1997) find ambiguous evidence for regulation-induced innovation at the industry
level. More precisely, they find pollution abatement costs expenditure (PACE) as a
proxy of regulatory stringency to have no significant impact on patent applications,
indicating a re-direction rather than a crowding out of patents as a measure for
innovation output. On the other hand, they find a positive impact of PACE on firms’
R&D expenditures controlling for industry specific effects. Similarly, Brunnermeier
and Cohen (2003) find PACE to have a significant positive impact on firms’ overall
patent applications.
The main reason for little empirical evidence at the firm-level may be related
to measurement problems due to a lack of sufficiently disaggregated data and
the difficulties in distinguishing regulation-induced and other innovative activi-
ties. The survey-based data set used for the following analysis has several features
that address these issues. The major advantage is that we can identify firms that
- as a reaction to the policy in place - implemented some sort of environmental
technology. Such technologies comprise, for instance, ways to reduce energy and
material consumption as well as waste, improved recycling methods and measures
to limit air, soil and water pollution. In other words, rather than using a proxy for
the stringency of environmental regulation we derive indicators from a survey that
allow us to identify directly whether regulation had indeed induced environment-
friendly technological changes in a particular firm. This does, but not exclusively,
cover cases in which firms developed the new technology themselves in addition
to firms that implemented environmental technology developed by others. Taking
that aspect into account is crucial as the diffusion of environmental technology
strongly depends on the adoption of existing technologies. Although it can be
argued that the former case of technology development is more resource inten-
sive and hence more likely to crowd-out other R&D, it should also be considered
that the implementation of these technologies in other firms may require criti-
cal amounts of human and financial resources. Such technologies not only need
to be acquired, but they also have to be incorporated into production processes,
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potentially requiring adjustment to and alignment with already implemented tech-
nologies. Moreover, new technologies usually require training of employees. Our
approach that takes the costs related to environmental innovation at the firm level
into account accommodates for the fact that compliance costs (which define the
impact of the environmental regulation) are highly firm-specific.
2.1 Regulation and Environmental Innovation
There is a considerable body of theoretical research on the impact of regulation
on environmental innovation that studies the effects of different regulatory instru-
ments like tradable permits, taxes or standards on the R&D incentives for pollu-
tion control technologies5. Much less work exists regarding the impact on both
pollution control and productive innovation investments. Magat (1978) assumes
a profit-maximizing firm subject to pollution control regulation that has to allocate
a fixed R&D budget over productive and abatement technologies which are sub-
stitutes. He concludes that a constant pollution tax provides decreasing incentives
for abatement R&D spending over time and therefore provides more incentives
for investment into productive R&D. Roughly speaking, this is because productive
R&D’s returns increase more rapidly than those of abatement spending if the tax is
constant over time. Conversely, a fixed emission standard has the feature that an
affected firm can grow only if it further invests in abatement R&D at the expense
of investment in productive R&D. Put it otherwise, R&D spent on pollution con-
trol crowds out conventional R&D in case of an emission standard. This effect is
smaller and decreases over time for a fixed pollution tax rate (or a cap and trade
system with a constant cap)6. Thus, the extent to which a crowding out occurs
may depend crucially on the policy design.
The number of regulations in force in Germany has increased substantially
during the past decades (see Figure 1). An overwhelming part of these laws
and directives are command-and-control regulations (see Frondel, Horbach and
Rennings 2007). This is strongly mirrored in the firm survey used for the present
5Popp et al. (2009) and review much of this literature.
6Please note that the results of Magat (1978) crucially depend on the degree of labor substi-
tutability. If substitutability was very easy, an emission standard leads to a relative increase in
conventional R&D over time.
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analysis.7
The majority (95.76 percent) out of 377 usable responses reported command-
and-control regulations as reasons for technology adoption between 2006 until
2008 (see Table A.2). The most frequently mentioned law is the German equiv-
alent to the 1970 US Clean Air Act, the so called Federal Pollution Control Act
(Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetz) which came into force in 1974 and is the most
important German regulation to restrict air pollution. Together with its adminis-
trative provision, the “TA Luft” (Technical Instructions on Air Quality Control) that
sets emission limits, the German Federal Pollution Control Act accounts for about
23.87 percent of the responses in our survey. In principle, one would not have ex-
pected such rather ancient regulations to provide any incentives for technological
change today after compliance had been achieved in the past. However, most of
these regulations such as the Federal Pollution Control Act have a dynamic charac-
ter that requires firms to operate the current state of the art abatement technology.
Also of high importance were two relatively new regulations that restrict the use of
hazardous chemicals. The RoHS directive (“Restriction of Hazardous Substances”
enforced in 2006) of the European Community restricts the use of lead, cadmium,
mercury, and some other metals in electronic devices and initiated process inno-
vations in 14.85 percent of the firms in our sample. Moreover, 11.41 percent of
the firms report the REACH directive, which stands for “Registration, Evaluation,
Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals”, that came into force in 2007 was the
reason for technological adaption of their production processes.
Another 8.48 percent mentioned the Energy Saving Regulation (EnEV) from
2002 which had been revised in 2007. It sets energy efficiency requirements for
buildings, especially for new ones. In general, more than 40 different command-
and-control regulations were named by firms as drivers of technology adoption.
Almost all of them were revised or augmented in the sample period 2006-2008,
or shortly before.
Only in about 1.86 percent of all responses, firms stated market-based regula-
7Unfortunately, only a fraction of the firms that adopted pollution control technology re-
sponded to the survey question of what specific regulation(s) or law(s) required adoption of
abatement technology. These answers, nevertheless, provide an indication of those regulations
that initiated the green innovations in the firms that we study in detail in the following.
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tions or energy taxes as the reasons for technological change8. The cited market
based regulation is the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) for green-
house gases that came into force in 2005. To add further evidence, we linked
our firm database to the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) that
reports every single firm that is covered in the EU ETS. In our data, only 1.22 per-
cent of the firms were identified to be subject to this cap and trade system. This
confirms that firms in our sample are mainly affected by command-and-control
regulations. Based on theoretical consideration by Magat (1978) and in light of
the predominance of the command-and-control character of these regulations, we
could therefore expect that in our setting a (partial) crowding out of other R&D
may indeed be more likely by compliance spending compared to a setting in which
market-based policy instruments are prevailing.
3 Identification Strategy
In the following, we are interested in the effects of regulation-induced environ-
mental innovation on the firms’ conventional innovative efforts. In this setting, we
therefore consider the introduction of an environmentally-friendly innovation due
to regulation to be the observed "treatment".9 Our main research question can be
illustrated by an equation describing the average treatment effect on the treated
firms
E(αTT ) = E(Y
T |R = 1)− E(Y C |R = 1) (1)
where Y T is an outcome variable10 and the status R indicates the group: R = 1 is
the treatment group and R = 0 the non-treated firms whereby the treatment refers
to regulation-induced environmental technology adoption as identified from the
firms’ self-reported information in the survey. Y C is the potential outcome which
would have been realized if the treatment group (R = 1) had not been treated.
While E(Y T |R = 1) is directly observable, this is not the case for E(Y C |R = 1).
However, as the probability to be subject to effective regulation is not random
8The remaining percentages account for the ISO 14001 standard or other voluntary agreements
mentioned as reason for innovation.
9See subsection 4.1 for more details on the definition of the treatment indicators.
10See subsection 4.2 for details on the outcome variables.
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(E(Y C |R = 1) 6= E(Y C |R = 0)) a potential "selection bias" may arise so that the
counterfactual situation cannot simply be approximated by the average outcome
of the non-regulated firms.11 The same applies to the receipt of a subsidy. Thus,
we have to take into account that not all firms are affected by regulation and not
all firms received a subsidy that supported their environmental technology. Inves-
tigating the behavior of firms that responded to regulation therefore requires to
take this selection into account. The conditional independence assumption (CIA)
Y C⊥R|X = x has been introduced by Rubin (1977) to overcome this selection
problem. That is in our case, regulation-induced environmental technology adop-
tion and the outcome variable of interest like non-green R&D spending are statisti-
cally independent for firms with the same set of exogenous characteristics X. The
result of the matching approach is such that the potential “untreated outcome”
of treated firms is constructed from a control group of firms that did not react
to environmental regulation by introducing some form of environmental technol-
ogy. Hence, the matching allows to compare the outcome of treated firms to the
hypothetical outcome of these firms if they had not been treated. Differences in
the outcome variable between these "groups" are then attributed to the treatment.
Consequently, if the CIA holds, it follows that
E(Y C |R = 1, X) = E(Y C |R = 0, X). (2)
Thus, the average treatment effect on the treated can be written as:
E(αTT ) = E(Y
T |R = 1, X = x)− E(Y C |R = 0, X = x) (3)
In the following analysis, we employ several matching techniques that have
the advantage not to require assumptions about functional forms and error term
distributions.12 Additionally, and in order to test the robustness of the results to a
possible violation of the conditional independence assumption, we estimate instru-
mental variables models in which we account for endogeneity in the relationship
11For surveys of econometric techniques addressing selection bias see Heckman, Lalonde and
Smith (1999) or Imbens and Wooldridge (2009).
12For discussions and applications of matching estimators see e.g. Angrist (1998), Heckman,
Ichimura and Todd (1997) and Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998), Dehejia and Wahba
(1999), and Smith and Todd (2005).
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between the outcome variable and the treatment.13
First and as a benchmark, we perform a nearest neighbor (NN) propensity
score matching. For that purpose, we pair each firm that had implemented a
regulation-induced environmental technology with the single closest non-regulation-
affected firm. Thus, for each treated firm we search for twins in the “potential
control group” that share the same characteristics X as the treated firms. The
pairs are defined based on the similarity in the estimated probability of having
introduced a compliance technology based on regulatory pressure.
In other words, as matching criterion we use the propensity score stemming
from a binary (probit) estimation using a dummy variable indicating the policy
induction. Matching on the propensity score has the advantage not to run into
the “curse of dimensionality” since we use only one single index as matching ar-
gument (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Thus, the first step of our analysis is the
specification and estimation of a probit model to obtain the propensity score Pˆ (X).
Thereby it is essential to have enough overlap between the control and the treated
group (common support) which means that in practice, the sub-samples of treated
firms and firms in the control group are restricted to those with common support.
Thus, in a second step we restrict the sample to common support. Therefore, we
calculate the minimum and the maximum of the propensity scores of the potential
control group and delete observations on treated firms with probabilities larger
than the maximum and smaller than the minimum in the potential control group.
Next, we pick one observation from the sub-sample of treated firms and remove
it from the pool of treated firms. Then we calculate the Mahalanobis Distance
(MD) between this firm and all non-treated firms in order to find the most similar
control observation:
MDi,j = (Zj − Zi)′Ω−1(Zj − Zi) (4)
where Ω is the empirical covariance matrix of the matching arguments (Z) based
on the sample of potential controls. After that, we select the observation with the
minimum distance from the remaining control group. Unlike for the treated firms,
we do not remove the selected control firms from the pool of potential controls.
This routine is applied to all treated firms. Finally, the average effect on the treated
13See section A in the Appendix for the details.
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can be calculated as the mean difference in the outcome variable(s) of the matched
samples using the matched group as comparison.
αˆTT =
1
nT
(∑
i
Y Ti −
∑
i
Yˆ Ci
)
(5)
with Yˆ Ci being the counterfactual for i and n
T is the sample size of treated firms.
We conduct t-tests on difference in means in the outcome variable(s) after the
matching. A significant difference in means may then be attributed to the treat-
ment. In our case, a smaller mean of the outcome variable, like non-environmental
R&D in the group of regulated firms, would indicate a crowding out due to the
regulation-induced environmental innovation.14
In order to assess the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the matching
estimator, we perform serval other matching approaches. In particular, in addition
to a two-nearest-neighbor matching, we want to reduce the risk of bad matches
that may occur if the closest neighbor is far away. This can be avoided by imposing
a caliper that limits the maximum propensity score distance. Finally, we perform
Kernel matching (KM) that use weighted averages of all firms in the control group
to construct the counterfactual outcome.15 The major advantage of this approach
is that more information is used and a lower variance can be achieved (Heckman
et al. 1997, Heckman et al. 1998).
4 Data
The main data used for our analysis stem from the 2009 wave of the Mannheim
Innovation Panel (MIP) that provides information for the years 2006-2008. The
MIP is the German part of the European-wide Community Innovation Surveys
(CIS). The survey is conducted annually by the Centre for European Economic
Research (ZEW), the infas (Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft) and the
ISI Fraunhofer Institute on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Education
14It should be noted that, since we perform sampling with replacement to estimate the coun-
terfactual situation, an ordinary t-statistic on mean differences is biased as it does not take the
possibility of repeated observations into account. We therefore follow Lechner (2001) and calcu-
late an asymptotic approximation of the standard errors that corrects for this bias.
15See Smith and Todd (2005) for technical details.
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and Research. The target population covers all firms with at least 5 employees
in the German business sector.16 Besides information on innovative activities and
general characteristics of the firms, the 2009 wave of the survey collected detailed
information on the adoption and production of environmental technologies. From
this core data set, we are able to identify firms that adopted or implemented some
form of environmental technology. This data has been complemented with a tele-
phone survey that addressed this sub-sample of firms that indicated in the CIS that
they had introduced environmentally-beneficial technologies. This additional tele-
phone survey allowed to collect more detailed information on the respective en-
vironmental technologies. The most important information drawn from this data
relates to the cost of introducing and implementing the environmental technology.
We complement the survey data with information on the firms patent applications
at the European Patent Office (EPO) and market concentration data from the Ger-
man Monopoly Commission. Finally, we obtain a credit rating index for each firm
from CREDITREFORM, Germany’s largest credit rating agency.17 After correction
for outliers and elimination of incomplete records the final sample contains 2,521
firm-level observations.
4.1 The Treatment
Firms were asked if they had introduced some form of technology or production
process with beneficial effects for the environment and if so, to indicate the initia-
tion factors for the development and/or adoption and implementation of the tech-
nology. In particular, firms were asked to indicate if this innovation was driven by
regulation, expectations about future regulation, public subsidies or, alternatively,
by customer demand and/or by voluntary agreements at the sector level. We
consider a firm to be treated if it introduced an environmentally-friendly techno-
logical innovation due to regulation (REG), but not due to customer demand for
greener technologies or voluntary agreements. Moreover, the treatment variable
thus takes the value one only, if regulations had induced the innovation, but the
16A detailed description of the survey data and the sampling method can be found in the back-
ground reports available at ZEW.
17See Czarnitzki, Hottenrott and Thorwarth (2011) for a more detailed description of the con-
struction of this index.
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firm did not receive subsidies for green technology of any type. Finally, we define
a treatment variable SUB that takes the value of one if the receipt of a subsidy
induced the introduction of environment-friendly technology.18 Table 1 presents
descriptive statistics for these treatment variables. It should be noted that the two
treatments exclude each other, i.e. there is no overlap between the groups. For
each of these treatments, we will estimate the treatment effect on the outcome
variables. The control group consists of 2,177 firms that fall in neither of the two
treatment categories. The ratio of treated to non-treated firms is favorable for a
matching approach for both treatment indicators as the potential control group is
sufficiently large.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of treatment indicators (2,521 obs.)
Variable # Treated firms Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
REG 179 0.071 0.257 0 1
SUB 165 0.065 0.247 0 1
4.2 Outcome Variables
Based on information from the CIS and the complementary survey, we derive a
handful of outcome variables on which a crowding out due to policy-induced en-
vironmental innovation might be suspected. The first one is the total number of
innovation projects in the period 2006-2008 (PROJECTS). A firm that has to
devote a substantial effort to fulfilling regulatory requirements may scale down
their overall innovation activity by reducing the number of projects that are ongo-
ing at the same time as the "environmental project". Secondly, we are interested in
a further potential input crowding out reflected in total innovation-related spend-
ing (INNO_TOTAL) which includes internal R&D (INNO_R&D), external R&D
as well as innovation-related investment in physical capital (INNO_INV ). Such
investments are usually considered to provide important assets complementary
to the intangible knowledge created by R&D. A crowding out of internal R&D
spending by regulation-induced innovation may have a substantial direct effect on
18Note that we test the robustness of our results to an alternative definition for which we con-
sider a firm to be treated only if it was both regulation-affected and subsidy-affected in section
6.
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innovation output and a long-term impact on the firms’ overall performance. How-
ever, it can easily be argued that these general numbers of innovation spending do
not account for the fact that regulation-induced innovation may have caused costs
that the firms counted as innovation-related spending. In that case, we would
underestimate a potential crowding out when looking at innovation spending as
an outcome variable. To take account of this fact, we use information obtained
through the additional telephone survey on the sub-sample of firms that indicated
in the CIS that they had introduced an environmental innovation. These firms
were asked to indicate the expenses related to the introduction of the environ-
mental innovation. Thus, we can deduct this amount from the total innovation
spending (INNO_TOTAL) and obtain the net innovation spending for innova-
tion (INNO_NET ) corrected for the regulation-induced investment.19 This sec-
ond survey addressed all firms in our sample that indicated that they had intro-
duced some form of environmental innovation. On average, these firms stated
they spend about 401 thousand euros (per year) on their environmental inno-
vation. The median, however, is much lower with about 50 thousand euros.
Moreover, we derive two measures for innovation outcomes. The first captures
whether the firm had successfully introduced a product innovation to the mar-
ket (PRODUCT_INNO) and the second if market introductions were planned
in the two years 2009 and 2010 following the survey (PRODUCT_LEAD). An-
other measure accounts for the possibility of unsuccessful projects outcomes, i.e.
it takes the value of one if the firm indicated that it had abandoned a innova-
tion project after it had already started (FAIL_INNO). We argued before that
firms may rather scale down investment in areas that are not directly related to
current production, but are rather long-term oriented and less certain in terms of
returns like R&D. For reasons of comparison we therefore also include the firms’
19Since we can not disentangle the expenses for the environmental innovation by its R&D and
fixed investment component, we calculate the net spending for the total innovation expenses only.
However, it should be kept in mind that INNO_NET is only a rough approximation due to two
limitations of the measure for environmental innovation expenses. First, these are total expenses
which may have occurred over more than one year. Deducting them from INNO_TOTAL implic-
itly assumes that the expenses had all been made in one year. Secondly, not all firms may have
included such expenses in the INNO_TOTAL as indicated in the CIS survey. For these firms,
we may "correct" the innovation expenses wrongly and hence underestimate their true innovation
expenditure. Nevertheless, as we can argue that the true total net innovation expenditure is some-
where between INNO_TOTAL and INNO_NET on average, we still want to include both of
these variables in the set of outcome variables.
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investment in non-innovation related assets (INV ) as an outcome variable. Table
2 presents summary statistics for the outcome variables. Firms have more than
seven ongoing innovation projects on average. The median number, however, is
much smaller with only one current project per firm. In-house R&D is about 367
thousand euros on average and innovation-specific physical investment about 358
thousand euros. Total innovation expenditure amounts to about 908 thousand
euros and total innovation expenditure net of all costs due to the environmental
technology development or adoption is 744 thousand euros, on average. Non-
innovation investment amounts to 2.5 million, on average. Forty-five percent of
the firms had some form of product innovation during the survey period and 43.6
percent had product innovations in the pipe-line. Five percent of the firms had
abandoned innovation projects.
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Outcome Variables (2,521 obs.)
Variable unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
PROJECTS # 7.893 42.795 0 1,500
INNO_TOTAL Td 908.241 3,478.525 0 30,000
INNO_R&D Td 367.292 1,693.363 0 14,000
INNO_INV Td 357.946 1,395.983 0 12,000
INNO_NET Td 744.433 3,120.815 0 30,000
INV Td 2,520.974 9,908.471 0 100,000
PRODUCT_INNO dummy 0.450 0.498 0 1
PRODUCT_LEAD dummy 0.436 0.496 0 1
FAIL_INNO dummy 0.050 0.216 0 1
4.3 Control Variables
A set of control variables is defined for inclusion in the first-stage probit model
in which we model the selection into the treatment. Thus, these control vari-
ables are likely to impact the fact of whether or not a firm has introduced an
environmental technology due to regulation and whether the firms used a subsidy
to (co-)finance the introduction, respectively. In particular, we include the firms’
logged value of fixed assets as more capital-intensive (as measured by the ratio
of fixed assets to sales) firms may be more likely to be subject to environmental
regulation (logCAP ). Likewise, we control for firm size by including the logged
15
number of employees (logLAB). Furthermore, we include the logged value of the
firms’ expenses on material and energy used in the production process (logMAT )
as more material and energy-intensive firms may have higher incentives to intro-
duce innovations that reduce consumption in these input factors and they may
be more likely to be affected by regulation. The (logged) age of the firms is in-
cluded (logAGE) to account for the fact that older firms may be more likely to
have to renew part of their production capital which may make them more likely
to make their production more environmentally-friendly when replacing their su-
perannuated assets. The firms’ labor productivity (LABPRO) measured as sales
per employee is included to account for the firms’ overall relative productivity.
The firms’ competitive environment is accounted for by including the Hirschman-
Herfindahl measure of sales concentration (HHI). We further include a dummy
to control for whether the firm is continuously R&D-active (d_R&D) and whether
it is a producer or supplier of environmental technology (ECPROD). The lat-
ter control especially addresses the concern that environmental R&D may also be
spent by firms to develop new, e.g. energy-saving, products or pollution control
technologies to be sold to other companies. That is, we want to control for the
fact that producing such environmental technology may be the core business of
some firms. The firms’ patent stock (PATSTOCK) is included to control for the
firms technological capabilities. We calculate the firms’ patent stock as a perpetual
inventory of patent applications with a constant depreciation rate of 15 percent,
as is common in the literature (Griliches and Mairesse 1984). We also account for
the fact whether the firm is part of an enterprize group (GROUP ). Additionally,
we control for structural differences between Eastern and Western Germany that
may affect the likelihood to react to regulatory pressure. Firms located in Eastern
Germany (EAST ) may show differences due to historical developments and due
to extensive general subsidy programs to foster innovation in Eastern Germany
(see for instance Czarnitzki (2006)). Finally, we distinguish 17 different sectors.
Table A.1 in the Appendix shows the distribution of firms over these sectors.
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4.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the outcome and control variables distin-
guishing between the treated and non-treated firms. As can be seen, several means
of the control variables are significantly different between the treated firms and
the control group only slightly varying with the definition of the treatment (REG
or SUB). For instance, regulation-affected firms are on average larger and are ac-
tive in more concentrated industries. Further, they are more often part of a group
and have a slightly lower labor productivity. Interestingly, if the treatment is de-
fined based on a subsidy receipt, then treated firms are more likely to be located
in Eastern Germany and more likely to conduct R&D on a continuous basis. With
respect to the outcome variables, we also do see some significant differences in
means. However, as argued above, it would be invalid to conclude that these dif-
ferences were due to compliance efforts. Likewise, the higher average investment
in innovation-related physical assets and other non-innovation related investment
in the group of subsidized firms does not necessarily mean that this higher invest-
ment was caused by the subsidy. The analysis presented in the following aims at
identifying the treatment effects taking the non-randomness of the treatment into
account.
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5 Econometric Results
5.1 Probit Models on the Selection into Treatment
As described above, in order to apply the matching estimator, we first estimate
a probit model to obtain the predicted probability of having introduced a policy-
induced environmental innovation. We estimate two different specifications, that
is one for each definition of the treatment. Table 4 presents the results from this
exercise. We find larger firms and more material and energy-intensive firms to
be more likely to introduce regulation-induced environmental technology. Firm
age and labor productivity are negatively associated with regulation-induced en-
vironmental innovations, while producers of environmental technologies are more
likely to be selected into the treatment REG. Larger firms in terms of employees
and continuously R&D-active firms are more likely to have introduced a subsidy-
supported environmental technology. Firms in Eastern Germany are more likely to
introduce an environmental innovation initiated by a subsidy. Group membership
is positively significant in model 1, but not in model 2. Finally, it turns out that
the industry dummies are jointly significant for the selection into both treatments.
5.2 The Matching
As mentioned before, a necessary condition for the validity of the matching es-
timator is common support. In our case, this condition is introduced for all our
firm pairs. Table 5 shows the results of the NN matching. All control variables are
well balanced after the matching so that we can conclude that the matching was
successful in the sense that a suitable nearest neighbor was found for each treated
firm. The only variables for which there is a significant difference in means after
the matching are some of the outcome variables. This difference can be attributed
to the respective treatment. However, it turns out that the effects of the treatment
on the outcome variable depend on the definition of the treatment. The results for
the treatment (REG) are presented on the left-hand side of table 5.
As can be gathered from the table, mean values for INNO_R&D and INNO_INV
are significantly lower for treated firms. This also translated into a significant over-
19
Table 4: Probit Estimation Results on the Selection into Treatment (2,521 obs.)
TREATMENT
Model 1: REG Model 2: SUB
log_CAP 0.032 0.027
(0.027) (0.034)
log_MAT 0.066** -0.036*
(0.031) (0.021)
log_LAB 0.060*** 0.083***
(0.013) (0.026)
log_AGE -0.042*** 0.004
(0.001) (0.115)
LABPRO -0.229 -0.001
(0.342) (0.008)
ECPROD 0.447*** 0.250***
(0.009) (0.040)
HHI -0.001*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
EAST -0.124*** 0.171**
(0.035) (0.078)
d_R&D -0.064 0.184*
(0.139) (0.100)
PATSTOCK -0.005** -0.002***
(0.003) (0.001)
GROUP 0.085*** -0.109
(0.032) (0.122)
Log pseudolikelihood -600.327 -554.474
Joint sign. of ind. dummies 7.51* 18.52***
LR χ2(27): 91.24*** 109.74***
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%.
Clustered standard errors (EAST ) presented in parentheses.
The models include a constant and 16 industry dummies.
20
all innovation spending and particularly net innovation spending (INNO_NET ).
This may suggest a partial crowding out of non-environment-related innovative
activities. The magnitude of the crowding out, that is the average treatment effect
on the treated (ATT), is the difference between the means. The ATT is higher for
R&D than for physical innovation investments and amounts to about 617 thousand
euros. Regulation-affected firms thus spend significantly less on internal R&D than
their matched control group. For the total innovation expenditure this difference
amounts to 833 thousand euros in the respective year, on average. For the adjusted
INNO_NET which is net of cost due to the environmental innovation the ATT
is slightly larger with about 978 thousand euros. Note that this is considerably
more than the average cost of introducing an environmental technology of 401
thousand euros. These results may thus imply that the average firm in our sample
reduced its overall innovation budget by more than the cost related to the environ-
mental innovation project. For the number of innovation projects we do not find
a significant difference between the groups. This may indicate that firms reduce
the scale rather than the scope of their R&D projects. As expected, investment in
non-innovation related physical assets are not subject to a crowding out. When we
consider subsidies as the treatment we no longer find such a crowding out effect,
as can be seen on the right-hand side of Table 5. Although we see that the mean
values for several of the outcome variables are higher in the treated group, the
difference is not statistically significant once we account for the fact that we had
been drawing from the control group with replacement. Thus, subsidized firms
also do not seem to invest significantly more than other firms due to the receipt of
public money.
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Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis
Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT)
treatment = REG
NN 2NN NN Caliper 2NN Caliper Kernel
INNO_R&D -662.124 -396.415 -534.012 -342.024 -224.405
INNO_INV -308.573
INNO_TOTAL -882.089 -502.021 -779.062 -468.145 -450.468
INNO_NET -1,041.152 -673.427 -939.922 -641.488 -596.552
ATT presented if significant at least at 10% level.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
To test the sensitivity of our results to specific features of our empirical strategy,
we perform a series of alternative matching estimators that share the beneficial
properties of non-parametric treatment effect models. Table 6 compares the aver-
age treatment effects (ATT) obtained from the NN matching with the results of the
two-NN matching, the caliper matching and the kernel matching (Epanechnikov
kernel). The caliper is defined such that the largest percentile of the Mahalanobis
Distance distribution is dropped from the sample. As can be seen in the table, the
estimated ATT varies across these different models. The direction of the effects
and their relative magnitude, however, is quite comparable between the different
matching approaches.
Based on these results, we conclude the 2NN matching with caliper provides
results that are well within the middle of the bandwidth of the range of outcomes.
Therefore, we use the results from the 2NN method for testing whether the av-
erage treatment effects differ between different groups of firms. Financially con-
strained firms, for instance, that have limited access to additional financing may
face a stronger crowding out compared to firms that can obtain additional funds
from external sources. Likewise, the regulatory burden may be comparatively
higher for smaller firms. To test these hypotheses we first calculate the individual
treatment effects as the difference between the overall outcome variables of the
treated firms and the control firms (j = 2) as follows:
ATTi = Yi − 1
N
ΣNj=1Y
c
j (6)
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Table 7: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated by Groups
treatment = REG
GROUP = 0 GROUP = 1 t-test
GROUP ATT Std. Err. ATT Std. Err.
INNO_R&D
SME < 250 emp. 288.167 3,285.414 -428.290 1,962.223 **
TOPRATING > 75% -459.707 2,336.690 350.564 2,325.267 **
Y OUNG < 19 yrs. -236.312 2,544.757 -286.818 2,095.495
INNO_NET
SME < 250 emp. 425.579 3,039.143 -963.413 4,267.835 **
TOPRATING > 75% -1,033.115 4,408.007 573.132 2,318.255 **
Y OUNG < 19 yrs. -544.616 3,953.533 -749.674 4,186.421
We then divide the sample into groups, calculate the means of ATTi and perform
t-tests on the differences in the ATT between groups. The upper panel in Table 7
shows that the treatment effect on INNO_R&D is significantly larger for small
firms with less than 250 employees. These findings are in line with insights from
the literature on financing constraints for innovation that identified SMEs to be
more likely to face financing constraints compared to larger firms. Likewise, rel-
atively younger firms in our sample (younger than the median) show a higher
treatment effect for net innovation expenditure. However, the difference is not
statistically significant. As a more direct measure for access to financing, we split
the sample based on the firms’ credit rating. Firms with outstanding credit ratings
should be able to raise funds in the financial markets at the best possible interest
rates independent of the type of investment project. Indeed, we find that for firms
with a credit rating in the top 25%, that is in the range between 100 and 193
(RATING ∈ [100, 600]), the ATT is even positive and significantly different from
the negative ATT of firms with worse credit ratings. In other words, we find a
negative treatment effect for all firms but those with the best credit ratings in our
sample.
7 Conclusion
The presented analysis set out to complement the few existing studies on potential
crowding out effects of policy-induced environmental innovation on firms’ conven-
tional innovative activities. Since innovation in general is a crucial driver of eco-
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nomic growth and competitiveness, a potential crowding out of other innovation
could be a barrier to competitiveness and economic growth in the long-run adding
to the cost of fighting environmental damage. Using different treatment effect
models, we estimated the effects of regulation-induced environmental innovation
on the firms’ non-green innovative activities. We find indeed evidence for some
crowding out of the firms’ R&D and total innovation expenditure net of those costs
due to the environmental innovation. On the other hand, we find such effects on
the number of ongoing R&D projects, investments in innovation-related and other
fixed assets nor on the outcome of innovation projects. Thus, firms may rather
scale down investment in areas like R&D that are not directly related to current
production, but are rather long-term oriented and less certain in terms of returns.
While the direction and significance of these findings is robust to the estimation
method, the magnitude of the estimated average treatment effects varied accord-
ing with an average estimate of 432 thousand euros within a bandwidth between
225 and 662 thousand euros. Interestingly, the estimated average reduction in
R&D is quite close to the reported annualized cost for the introduced environmen-
tal technology of about 401 thousand euros. We also observed differences in the
magnitude of the estimated treatment effect between different groups of firms.
Larger firms experience significant smaller treatment effects and firms with very
good credit ratings even show a positive treatment effect, on average. This points
to the conclusion that firms that already face financing constraints may have to
scale down current R&D to a greater extent than less constrained firms.
The observed effects may be due to short-term budget re-allocation from R&D
to compliance efforts. As R&D expenditures are to a large part spent on re-
searchers’ wages and we assume wages to be rather fixed in the short-term, we
can only hypothesize that firms may re-allocate R&D employees’ tasks. However,
affected firms were not more likely to cancel ongoing projects nor did they report
lower expectations regarding the market introduction of new products as com-
pared to the control group. Moreover, for firms with subsidy-induced environmen-
tal innovations, no crowding out of non-green R&D is found. While these results
support the idea that a policy mix of market-based mechanisms, direct financial
support, and command-and-control regulation may yield most efficient environ-
25
mentally beneficial technological advances, they also suggest that the observed
effects may be rather short-term and not detrimental for affected firms’ innova-
tion performance.
However, these results should be interpreted with the study’s limitations in
mind. The ideal experiment would require to observe firms and how regulation
induces environmental investments over time. Additionally, the present study ab-
stracted from making welfare assessments as the unit of observation was the firm.
Accounting for the public costs associated with the provision of environmental
subsidies appears notwithstanding crucial for the evaluation environmental poli-
cies, especially in a inter-generational context (Leach and Laurent-Lucchetti 2011)
as well as considering the global opportunity cost of climate change policy (?).
Future research would therefore benefit from panel data observing R&D activ-
ities and regulatory changes over a longer period of time, and ideally, even at the
project level. Such data would allow to assess the impact of regulation-induced en-
vironmental technology on the long-run innovation performance in product mar-
kets and hence on firms’ overall competitiveness. In case of a substantial crowding
out of competitiveness-enhancing R&D, one would expect to observe a reduced
overall innovation performance of affected firms. Moreover, while there might be
a crowding out in the sense that "other R&D" is reduced if firms devoted effort
to introducing environmental innovations, this may also be the result of rational,
profit maximizing firms switching R&D resources from established, for instance,
more energy- intensive technologies, to greener technologies. If the crowding out
affects merely dirty technologies we would expect no long-lasting effect on inno-
vation and firm performance. We therefore strongly encourage further research
that tackles the challenge to study the nature and heterogeneity of environmental
regulation, subsidy programs and new technologies.
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Figure 1: Cumulated number of Regulations in Germany
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Table A.2: Effective laws, ordered by frequency of citation
No. Acronym Description
1 BImschG/(BImschV) Federal Emission Control Act/(Directives)
2 RoHS European Directive on Restriction of hazardous substances
3 REACH European Directive on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisa-
tion and Restriction of Chemicals
4 EnEV Energy Saving Directive (for Buildings)
5 TA Luft Technical Guidance on Clean Air (directive for BimschG)
6 WHG Water Resource Law
7 VOC Directive Directive to Limit Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC)
Emissions
8 WEEE European Directive on Waste of Electrical and Electronic
Equipment
9 EEG Renewable Energy Law
10 VerpackV Packaging Ordinance
11 ElektroG Electrical and Electronic Equipment Act (German imple-
mentation of the WEEE Directive)
12 GefStoffV Hazardous Substances Regulation
13 KrW-/AbfG Recycling and Waste Management Act
14 Euro 5 Euro 5 Air Emission Standard for Cars
15 TA Lärm Technical Guidance on Noise Mitigation
16 EU ETS European Emission Trading Scheme for CO2
17 ISO 14001 ISO 14001 Environmental Management Standard
18 Decopaint Directive European Directive on VOC limitation in colors and paints
19 EUP European Energy-using Products Directive
20 UschadG Environmental Damage Act
21 EnWG Energy Management Act
22 BBodSchG Federal Soil Protection Act
23 KWKG Combined Heat and Power Act
24 EnEG Energy Saving Act
25 BNatSchG Federal Nature Conservation Act
26 DüMV Fertilizer Act
27 Deponie-RiLi European Landfill Directive
28 MarPol International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships
29 TA Siedlungsabfall Technical Guidance on Municipal Waste
30 DepV German Landfill Directive
31 EnergieStG Energy Taxation Act
32 StromsteuerG Electricity Taxation Act
33 Euro 4 Euro 4 Air Emission Standard for Cars
34 Wasserrahmenrichtlinie Water Framework Directive
35 Abwasserrahmenrichtlinie European Wastewater Directive
36 GSchV Water Protection Directive
37 ErsatzbaustoffV Directive on Substitute Materials for Buildings
38 EG-AbfVerbrV European Waste Shipment Directive
39 AbfAblV Waste Storage Directive
40 STrSchG Radiation Protection Act
41 VO(EG) Nr. 842/2006 (FKW) European Directive on Certain Fluorinated Greenhouse
Gases
42 EEWärmeG Renewable Energy Heat Act
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Appendix A: Instrumental Variable Regressions
As an alternative to the treatment models presented before, Table A.3 shows the
results from a two-stage least squares estimation taking into account the endo-
geneity of the treatment variables. For the purpose of the IV regressions, we con-
struct instrumental variables (IV) that are correlated to the potentially endogenous
variable, i.e. the treatment indicators, but exogenous to the individual firm’s in-
novation activity. For REG we derive three IV. The first (IV 1_REG) is a regional
measure of woodland area per inhabitant at the four-digit regional code which
divides Germany in 413 districts. We would expect industrial density to be lower
in areas with a higher woodland area per inhabitant. Firms in such regions com-
pared to firms in densely populated areas should be less likely to be affected by
regulation as several environmental laws require stricter environmental specifica-
tion and regulation in latter areas (see for instance the Federal Emission Control
Act). The second (IV 2_REG) is the average frequency of regulation-affected firm
by size class.20 Thereby we differentiate between Eastern and Western Germany
because of the structural differences between the regions. The third (IV 3_REG)
captures the average frequency by industry. Industries are classified as described
in Table A.1. Like in the previous case we also distinguish between Eastern and
Western Germany.
In a similar fashion, the first IV for SUB is constructed from an average fre-
quency of effective environmental subsidies in a four-digit geographical district
IV 1_SUB. The second IV is derived from a proximity measure to high ways
IV 2_SUB. In a region with a dense weak highway infrastructure, we would
expect a higher occurrence of subsidies. Third, we take the unemployment per-
centage in a four-digit district of an indication on the liquidity of the public sector
in that region. If unemployment is high fewer subsides may be granted that are
specific for environmental technology. The same set of control variables as in the
selection equation for the propensity score estimation is included. We limit the
presentation of the model results to the outcome variable (INNO_R&D). The
20We construct five classes based on the firms’ workforce size ranging from 1-50 employees,
from 51-150 employees, from 151-250 employees, from 251-500 employees and larger than 500
employees, respectively.
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left hand side of the table presents the results for the case of regulation-induced
technology adoption while the right hand side shows the results for the subsidy-
backed case. The test statistics show that the IV fulfil the commonly used criteria
for valid instruments. The instruments are relevant at the first stage (see F-Test of
joint significance of the excluded instruments in the first stage at the bottom of Ta-
ble A.3) and the Hansen J test statistic, i.e. the heteroscedasticity-robust version of
the Sargan test rejects overidentification. The coefficient of REG is negative and
significant in the second stage in line with the matching results. The coefficient
of SUB, on the other hand, is positive albeit fails to pass the threshold for being
statistically significant at the 10% level. Thus, both models provide results that
are in line the matching results.
Table A.3: Instrumental Variable Regressions on ln[INNO_R&D+ 1] (2,521 obs.)
treatment = REG treatment = SUB
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Variables:
REG | SUB -3.340 (1.562)** 1.081 (0.782)
log_CAP 0.004 (0.003)* 0.028 (0.020) 0.002 (0.003) 0.011 (0.017)
log_MAT 0.006 (0.004) -0.035 (0.043) -0.004 (0.006) -0.047 (0.041)
log_LAB 0.001 (0.004) 0.475 (0.035)*** 0.010 (0.004)** 0.441 (0.031)***
log_AGE -0.006 (0.006) -0.017 (0.046) -0.001 (0.006) 0.001 (0.042)
LABPRO -0.002 (0.001)* 0.034 (0.017)** 0.001 (0.001) 0.038 (0.019)**
HHI 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)*** 0.001 (0.001)*
ECPROD 0.069 (0.015)*** 0.548 (0.142)*** 0.035 (0.013)*** 0.285 (0.088)***
d_R&D -0.012 (0.007) 1.913 (0.075)*** 0.018 (0.007)** 1.927 (0.069)***
PATSTOCK -0.001 (0.001) 0.007 (0.004)* -0.001 (0.001) 0.008 (0.004)**
EAST 0.022 (0.014) -0.021 (0.086) 0.026 (0.017) 0.006 (0.073)
GROUP 0.002 (0.014) 0.351 (0.102)*** -0.013 (0.012) 0.336 (0.091)***
IV 1_REG 1.035 (0.285)*** 0.969 (0.152)***
IV 2_REG 0.983 (0.247)*** -0.001 (0.001)**
IV 3_REG -0.001 (0.001)** -0.004 (0.002)**
IV 1_SUB
IV 2_SUB
IV 3_SUB
Cragg-Donald F-test 10.553*** 24.582***
Hansen J 4.011 0.459
R2 0.63 0.71
Joint sign. industries 232.87*** 254.16***
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%.
Intercepts and industry dummies not presented.
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